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Abstract 
This paper considers future European growth prospects in the light of a new productivity paradox, 
namely, the co-existence of a productivity slowdown and exciting new technologies.  Several 
potential explanations are reviewed.  It is argued that while some are unpersuasive it is too soon to 
be sure which carry the most weight.  This has the implication that while the slowdown is real it is 
not necessarily permanent.  A key, hotly disputed, issue is the future economic impact of 
technological progress on which forecasts differ dramatically.  Supply-side reform could have a 
strong positive effect but this is not likely to happen. 
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Introduction 
At the turn of the century, in the excitement of the so-called ‘new economy’, optimism abounded 
about the prospects for future economic growth.   Alan Greenspan (2000) said in a speech that 
“When we look back at the 1990s from the perspective of, say, 2010 ... we may conceivably conclude 
... that, at the turn of the millennium, the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century 
acceleration of innovation which propelled forward productivity ... at a pace not seen in generations, 
if ever.”1  Within a few years, this was revealed to be (widely shared) wishful thinking.  Now, 
prompted by Larry Summers (2014), the talk is of ‘secular stagnation’ and the future is feared to be 
one of slow growth in which productivity advance will be very weak.  This is understandable given 
the productivity slowdown in the OECD countries since the onset of the financial crisis.  The level of 
labour productivity, both in Europe and in the United States, is well below what would have been 
expected on the basis of pre-crisis trends. 
Current mainstream projections for medium-term growth in the United States and Western Europe 
are displayed in Table 1 and placed in the context of earlier, pre-crisis growth rates.  Although 
recovery from the dismal performance of the least few years is envisaged, the scaling down of 
projected growth compared with pre-2007 is quite marked.  Compared with growth during the years 
1995-2007, future American and European growth of real GDP per person is seen as likely to be 
halved or worse.  In each case, a serious weakening of labour productivity growth is expected.  
Compared with the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s, the slowdown is even more pronounced, 
especially for Europe. 
It is, of course, not unknown for economists to make inaccurate predictions about future growth or 
to be slow to appreciate the scope for improved productivity performance.  Alvin Hansen (1939), the 
founding father of the idea of secular stagnation, is a spectacular example.  He thought technological 
progress was too weak to generate economic growth at a rate that would encourage investment and 
avert a future of sustained high unemployment.  In fact, the halcyon period of American economic 
growth in the post-war economic boom was on the horizon in an economy which was already 
experiencing very rapid total factor productivity (TFP) growth.  In 1987, on the eve of the ICT 
revolution, Robert Solow lamented that paradoxically you could see the computer everywhere 
except in the productivity statistics. 
A similar disconnect seems to be around at present.  Excitement about (or fear of the consequences 
of) robots is apparent from a casual reading of the newspapers.  And the academic world has some 
well-known techno-optimists including Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2014) who stand out 
for their projections of the implications of what they call the ‘second machine age’ based on artificial 
intelligence, robotics and the digital revolution.  They suggest that this will have a larger impact than 
anything since the industrial revolution and will deliver an unprecedented rate of technological 
advance.   
There are several possible explanations for this new productivity paradox which I shall examine in 
what follows.  These include measurement issues, implications of the financial crisis, changes in 
                                                          
1 It is fair to point out that Greenspan noted that it was not possible to rule out the alternative that there was a 
massive speculative bubble, but the speech makes clear that he was a true believer that it was a productivity 
miracle. 
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supply-side policy, unreliability of productivity-growth projections, the absence of great inventions, 
and lack of business dynamism.  Evaluating these competing hypotheses is central to beliefs about 
future European growth prospects. 
Growth is Under-Estimated 
Despite scepticism in some quarters, the accounting framework of GDP remains an appropriate 
measure of flows of production.  It is not a measure of well-being or of non-market production both 
of which may be augmented considerably by the new technologies of the digital age.  It is probably 
fair to say, however, that the practical difficulties of compiling the national accounts have increased 
in the recent past (Ahmad and Schreyer, 2016). 
Even though the conceptual approach of national income accounting is still valid, in practice it is not 
well measured in particular because of the difficulties of deflating estimates in current prices into 
constant prices.  These are in large part a consequence of technological change together with the 
quality change and new goods and services that it delivers.  There is general agreement that true 
inflation tends to be over-estimated and, accordingly, real GDP growth is under-estimated, possibly 
quite significantly, by the practices currently used by government statistical offices.  The literature 
which mainly concerns the United States, has, for example, highlighted not taking quality change in 
most of the economy seriously (Feldstein, 2017), the use of inappropriate imputation of prices 
where old goods are replaced by new goods (Aghion et al, 2017), and failures adequately to track 
declines in the prices of IT equipment and IT services (Byrne and Corrado, 2017a) or to incorporate 
well new aspects of consumption such as digital services (Byrne and Corrado, 2017b).  It is not 
difficult to think that the growth rate of real GDP in the United States is of the order of 1 percentage 
point per year faster than officially stated. 
Mismeasurement of real GDP growth does not, however, explain much if any of the productivity 
slowdown.  This is because the problems outlined above are not new and, in some cases, were more 
serious in earlier years, or their impact is too small to account for much of the productivity shortfall 
(Byrne et al., 2016).  Thus, the ‘missing growth’ estimated by Aghion et al. (2017) rose from 0.52 in 
1983-2005 to 0.69 per cent per year in 2006-13 compared with a decrease in real GDP growth from 
2.06 to 1.59 per cent per year while the corrections to ICT prices proposed by Byrne and Corrado 
(2017a) would add 0.4 percentage points to American growth between 1995 and 2006 but only 0.2 
percentage points between 2006 and 2015.  The unmeasured consumer gains from internet-linked 
technologies probably equate to less than 5 per cent of the reduction in the level of GDP in 2015 
compared with what might have been expected in the absence of the productivity slowdown 
(Syverson, 2016). 
In other words, measurement issues can help to explain part of the new productivity paradox.  Real 
GDP growth is significantly understated by the national accounts and, as is always the case, some of 
the welfare gains from technological change occur outside the scope of GDP.  However, it seems 
unlikely that mismeasurement is the reason for the recent marked decline in productivity growth.  
The evidence relates to the United States but there is every reason to think that the same analysis 
also applies to Western Europe. 
Implications of the Financial Crisis 
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Labour productivity growth in Europe has persistently been very weak since the crisis began, as can 
be seen in Table 1.  This raises the question of the extent to which disappointing performance 
reflects a one-time adjustment to a lower level of potential output or a ‘new normal’ lower trend 
rate of growth of productivity.  It is well-known that financial crises can have permanent adverse 
direct effects on the level of potential output.  Thinking in terms of a production function or growth 
accounting, there may be direct adverse effects on capital inputs as investment is interrupted, on 
human capital if skills are lost, on labour inputs through increases in equilibrium unemployment, and 
on TFP if R & D is cut back or if innovative firms cannot get finance.   
Based on past experience, the orthodox view predicts a significant levels effect but no impact on 
future trend growth such that log labour productivity will maintain a trend path parallel to what 
would have been expected in 2007.  This was the explicit assumption of OECD (2012, ch. 4), which 
stated that the levels effect would on average be about 2.5 per cent.  Furceri and Mourougane 
(2012) estimate that for OECD countries a severe banking crisis reduces the level of potential output 
by about 4 per cent while Oulton and Sebastia-Barrel (2016) find an impact for all countries of 1.1 
per cent per year that the crisis lasts.   A later analysis by OECD economists found that the median 
impact in 2014 had reached 5.5 per cent (Ollivaud and Turner, 2015), of which about 2.2 percentage 
points came through TFP, but how close an approximation this might be to the permanent levels 
effects is not clear.   
The transition period while the levels effect materializes may be quite long.  Moreover, recovery is 
often slow (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014) such that output is below trend levels for some time.  This 
could imply that recent labour productivity performance basically reflects a large levels effect 
resulting from the financial crisis.  A more pessimistic interpretation would be that it is partly the 
result of a slowdown in trend labour productivity growth.  A more optimistic interpretation would be 
that some of what is feared to be a permanent effect will actually be regained as the economy 
returns to normal.  At this point, it is too soon to know but it seems unlikely that a levels effect from 
the crisis plays no part in explaining the new productivity paradox. 
It should also be recognised that the architecture of the Eurozone has precluded the use of either 
fiscal stimulus or unconventional monetary policy to escape the liquidity trap and eliminate the 
output gap.  This can be seen in the design of the ECB and the priority given to fiscal consolidation in 
the face of high levels of public debt.  In particular, a credible commitment by the ECB significantly to 
raise the rate of inflation and thereby lowering real interest rates is not possible.  The central bank 
was designed for normal times rather than to deal with the policy issues raised by a depressed 
economy.   
There is a stark contrast with the recovery made by the United States in the 1930s which 
confounded Alvin Hansen’s pessimism.  The key was ‘regime change’.  Leaving the gold standard was 
a clear signal that the deflationary period was over.   Roosevelt’s several actions on taking office, 
comprising leaving gold, announcing an objective of restoring the prices to pre-Depression levels, 
and implementing New Deal spending amounted to a credible policy that delivered a major change 
in inflationary expectations which drove down real interest rates and raised the expected money 
supply, i.e., the classic recipe for escaping the liquidity trap based on ‘unconventional’ monetary 
stimulus (Eggertsson, 2008).  A key feature of the period was the Federal Reserve Bank lost its 
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independence and became subservient to the Treasury after the exit of the United States from the 
gold standard (Meltzer, 2003). 
Supply-Side Policy 
Modern growth economics recognizes that supply-side policy can influence long-run growth 
performance (Aghion and Howitt, 2006).  The main thrust is that growth depends on investment in 
tangible and intangible capital, in education and training, and on innovation.  Decisions to invest and 
innovate respond to economic incentives such that well-designed policy which addresses market 
failures can raise the growth rate a bit.  This implies governments need to pay attention to making 
investments that complement private sector capital accumulation, for example in infrastructure, to 
supporting activities like education and research and development where social returns exceed 
private returns, to avoiding the imposition of high marginal direct tax rates, to recognising that 
regulations can undermine productivity, and to fostering competitive pressure on management to 
develop and adopt cost-effective innovations. 
If European supply-side policy has moved in the wrong direction recently, this could potentially 
explain weak productivity growth despite promising technological opportunities.  A danger might be 
that the financial crisis has provoked, or that its legacy of populism and Euro-scepticism will yet 
encourage, retrograde steps.  This would echo the experience of Britain in the 1930s where big 
economic shocks led to protectionism and a retreat from competition with long-lasting adverse 
effects on productivity performance (Crafts, 2012).  In fact, it seems that there has been a slowing 
down in the rate of improvement of supply-side policy but relatively little evidence of deterioration.  
This is reflected in the indicators reported in Tables 2 through 4. 
Regulations can inhibit innovation or slow down adjustment to new technologies or changes in 
comparative advantage.  Empirical studies indicate that product market regulations that create 
barriers to entry (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005) and employment protection that makes 
reorganization of the labour force costly (Caballero et al., 2013) have a significant cost in terms of 
foregone productivity growth.  Both aspects of regulation have been shown to retard the diffusion of 
ICT (Cette and Lopez, 2012).  The most commonly used indices which are reported in Table 2, PMR 
and EP, are those constructed by OECD.  For PR, the picture is one of quite rapid reform pre-2008 
which subsequently slowed considerably but was not reversed in the next 5 years.  With regard to 
EP, progress has generally been slow throughout with the notable exception of Southern Europe 
post-2008. 
Reforming taxation with a view to increasing the growth rate would generally entail reducing 
marginal direct tax rates, especially on corporate income, and increasing indirect and property taxes.  
Calculations of Effective Average and Effective Marginal Tax Rates (taking into account capital 
allowances) are reported in Table 3.  On average tax rates fell before and after 2007 but more 
rapidly in the pre-crisis period; for example, the average fall in EATR was 3.4 versus 1.9 percentage 
points.  Estimates by OECD economists suggest that that the impact of this slowdown in tax-cutting 
on labour productivity growth would be modest (Johansson et al., 2008). 
There is consensus in the literature that R & D has a strong impact on TFP growth (with an elasticity 
of perhaps 0.15) and has a very high social rate of return, on average 2 to 3 times as high as the 
median private rate of return of around 20 to 25 per cent (Frontier Economics, 2014).  More 
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generally, the process of innovation is exposed to market failures and there is a strong prima facie 
case for government intervention.  The news from Table 4 is encouraging – in all countries except 
Finland and Sweden the proportion of GDP spent on R & D increased between 2005 and 2015. 
On the basis that supply-side policies will continue slowly to improve and that productivity growth in 
the leading economy, the United States will continue at a respectable pace, OECD (2014) made 
growth projections using the framework of a catch-up growth model.  These are summarized in 
Table 5 which shows that the implications are much more optimistic than the inferences drawn from 
econometric analysis by Havik et al. (2014).  Indeed, it would be possible to be more bullish if policy 
reform speeded up since there is considerable scope for improvement in supply-side policy in many 
European countries if only political obstacles could be overcome (Barnes et al., 2011). 
The new productivity paradox is not explained by new failures of supply-side policy but successful 
reform would help to ensure that slow growth is not the ‘new normal’.  It must be said that the 
likelihood of such change has not been increased by recent political developments which seem to be 
motivated by desires for greater government intervention, protectionism and redistribution. 
TFP Growth is Unpredictable 
An important reason for pessimism about future growth prospects is econometric evidence based 
on various time-series methods that trend growth of labour productivity both in Europe and also the 
United States is now considerably lower than at the start of the 21st century.  For example, two 
influential papers which provide estimates for the Euro area are by Antolin-Diaz et al. (2017) and 
Ollivaud et al. (2016).  The former finds that trend labour productivity growth was 1.6 per cent per 
year in 2000, 0.9 per cent in 2007 and 0.7 per cent in 2015 while in the latter the decline is from 1.2 
per cent in 2000 to 0.7 per cent in 2007 and 0.3 per cent in 2015.  In both studies, a sizeable decline 
was apparent before the crisis. 
Technological change is the ultimate source of sustained growth of labor productivity and thus of 
long-run increases in living standards.  In a conventional neoclassical growth model, it will be 
represented by the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).  Here the rate of growth of the capital 
stock is endogenous and, in the steady state, is equal to the exogenous natural rate of growth.  Thus, 
a rise in the TFP growth rate induces capital accumulation and the steady-state rate of labour 
productivity growth is proportional to TFP growth.  So, for projections of the rate of growth of 
potential output, the future TFP growth rate is the fundamental building block.  In a world-leading 
economy (United States) this will be largely based on domestic innovative activity but in follower 
economies (Western Europe) mainly on technology transfer to exploit opportunities arising from TFP 
growth at the frontier. 
If future American TFP growth is a key determinant of future trend labor productivity growth in 
Europe, how easy is it to forecast and is recent trend TFP growth a good guide to future medium-
term performance?  As Figure 1 underlines, the answers are ‘extremely difficult’ and ‘definitely not’.  
The 10-year-ahead projection for TFP growth which graphs the average TFP growth rate over the 
next ten years shows considerable variability within a range from 2.0 to 0.3 per cent per year.  Also 
plotted in the graph are estimates of trend TFP growth at the same time using an unobserved 
components model with data from the previous 20 or 25 years.  Forecasting on this basis would have 
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missed the productivity slowdown of the 1970s, the ‘new-economy’ acceleration of the mid-1990s, 
and the slowdown of recent years – in other words, all the major episodes during the period! 
The implication is that an econometric estimate of current low trend productivity growth does not 
necessarily rule out a productivity surge in the near future.  The precedent of the 1990s is witness to 
this.  Econometrics is inherently backward looking and gives no weight to information about future 
technological progress.  A techno-optimist should not feel too dismayed by the results of time-series 
analysis. 
Great Inventions Make the Difference? 
A possible explanation for the new productivity paradox is that there is a great deal of much-
remarked innovative activity but it will have only a relatively weak economic impact, i.e, only a 
modest effect on TFP growth or labor productivity growth.  This view has been strongly advocated 
by Robert Gordon (2016) who argues that the phase of rapid American TFP growth in the 20th 
century was based on the ‘great inventions’ of the second industrial revolution and that nothing of 
similar importance is in the offing.  Gordon sees TFP growth of about 0.4 per cent per year in the 
business sector over the next 25 years.  This is a stark contrast with Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), 
the techno-optimists, who suppose TFP growth of at least 2.0 per cent per year. 
Both parts of Gordon’s argument deserve to be challenged.  Several serious research studies see 
substantial productivity potential in new technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics 
which they expect to materialize in the next 20 years or so.   Their explanation of the paradox is that 
it will be resolved by a future acceleration of productivity growth.  Indeed, the history of general 
purpose technologies is that their main impact on productivity growth takes time.  For steam this 
only came in the mid-19th century (Crafts, 2004) and for electricity it took until the 1920s (David, 
1991).  Widespread diffusion depends on cost-effectiveness.  Over time this improves as the 
technology evolves and its potential is better understood.  In the early stages, the use of the 
technology is too limited to have a big effect on macro productivity. 
Frey and Osborne (2013) estimated that 47 per cent of 2010 employment in the United States has at 
least a 70 per cent chance of being computerized by 2035. Future advances will come in machine 
learning which will be applied in mobile robotics as hitherto non-routine tasks are turned into well-
defined problems, in particular using big data which will allow substitution of (much cheaper) robots 
for labour in a wide range of low-wage service occupations.  Arntz et al. (2016) adapt the Frey and 
Osborne approach to consider tasks rather than occupations and see relatively few jobs (perhaps 9 
per cent) as completely automatable but, nevertheless, estimate that between 35 and 45 per cent of 
tasks in European countries will be susceptible of automatibility.  If either of these estimates is 
correct, the upside is that this technology alone could deliver labour productivity gains equivalent to, 
say, 1.5 per cent per year over the next 20 years.  A wider perspective which encompasses driverless 
cars, universal multi-jointed robots and data-driven expert systems sees labor productivity growth of 
2.5 per cent per year as attainable (Bartelsman, 2013). 
A recent paper quantifies sectoral contributions to American TFP growth before World War II 
(Bakker et al., 2017).  It concludes that the great inventions made a strong but not dominant 
contribution.  Their absolute impact was actually not very different from the IT sectors in the last 40 
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years while the proportion of TFP growth that they contributed was lower (see Table 6).2  Compared 
with recent years, the striking feature of the pre-war American economy is actually how broadly-
based TFP growth was and how much accrued from the non-great-invention sectors.  Indeed, with 
TFP growth at 1.87 per cent per year in the period 1929-41, there was a strong antidote to Hansen’s 
secular stagnation. 
So, great inventions do matter but they do not make all the difference and they may not all be in the 
past. 
Lack of Business Dynamism 
A number of writers have recently suggested that business or economic dynamism has decreased in 
the United States, especially since the start of the 21st century, with adverse implications for 
productivity growth.  The symptoms of the problem are declining rates of business start-ups, job 
turnover, and lower responsiveness in shifting resources in response to productivity shocks.  These 
are the underpinnings of TFP growth beyond the impact of great inventions.  A decline in the 
contribution of entry of new firms and reallocation of employment shares between firms accounts 
for most of the fall in productivity growth after 2000 (Decker et al., 2017).  As these authors note, 
here is another potential explanation of the new productivity paradox. 
At present, there is no convincing explanation for declining dynamism nor is it clear whether this is a 
temporary or a permanent phenomenon.  Similar analyses are not available for European countries.  
However, the process of creative destruction clearly works much less well in many European 
countries than in the United States as is witnessed by processes of entry and exit of firms and the 
much stronger growth rate of successful American start-ups (Encaoua, 2009).  A corollary of this is 
that, on average, countries in the European Union, especially in Southern Europe, are much inferior 
to the United States in shifting employment away from less productive towards more productive 
firms and this may account for as much as 20 percentage points of the labour productivity gap 
between the EU and the USA (see Table 7).  For the EU as a whole, allocative efficiency in services 
was only 0.036 in 2005 (Andrews and Cingano, 2014).3   
Bartelsman (2013) in his optimistic growth scenario in which he thought 2.5 per cent per year labour 
productivity growth in Europe was possible emphasized that this would require policies which 
encouraged economic dynamism.  In particular, he noted that a massive reallocation of workers 
would be required and that displaced workers would need to be redeployed rather than become 
unemployed.  It seems quite possible that the issue that Europe really confronts is actually not so 
much slow technological progress but that the skill-bias of new technologies has a big downside in 
terms of a serious adjustment problem in the labour market.  The data reported in Table 8 suggest 
that many, if not all, European countries are more vulnerable to the technology shocks associated 
                                                          
2 The calculations reported in Table 6 offer two variants depending on whether distribution is classified as a 
great-invention sector (as Gordon does) or not.  Gordon’s classification appears to be based on the assumption 
that TFP growth in this sector relied on spillovers from the development of motor transport which allowed 
supermarkets to replace corner stores.  This would presumably be an upper bound and the sector would not 
be included in a conventional account of the inventions of the second industrial revolution.  
3 The OP gap is defined as the difference between the weighted and unweighted average of labor productivity 
across firms.  A completely random allocation of employment across firms would imply that the AE = 0.  A 
higher value connotes a greater level of allocative efficiency. 
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with ICT and robotics than the United States.  The symptoms are relatively high proportions of 
workers with less than upper-secondary education, more generous replacement rates, and higher 
levels of employment protection.4  There will be a premium on ‘flexible’ labor markets which are 
absent in much of Europe and may be harder to promote in a populist era. 
Conclusions 
I have reviewed six hypotheses that might explain the paradox of apparently rapid technological 
progress co-existing with slow productivity growth in the United States and Europe.  Three of these, 
namely, adverse changes in supply-side policy, an absence of great inventions with economic impact, 
and a loss of economic dynamism in the private sector, could singly or in combination imply that 
slow economic growth has indeed become the ‘new normal’.  On the other hand, finding reasons to 
discount current estimates of trend productivity growth or thinking that temporary effects of the 
crisis are still undermining performance are interpretations of the paradox which might entertain 
the idea that economic growth will revive in the medium term.  Finally, if growth is badly measured, 
the productivity slowdown could be a statistical artefact. 
My reading of the evidence is as follows.  First, economic growth is faster than is captured by the 
national income accounts.  This is not new, however, and it seems unlikely that the productivity 
slowdown is the result of errors in the data.  Second, the financial crisis has reduced the level of 
potential output and its effects have lingered.  There is no compelling reason to believe that it has 
affected the trend rate of growth but it has meant a lost decade.  Third, supply-side policy in most 
European countries leaves a lot to be desired but it has not significantly deteriorated in recent years, 
although populism is a threat.  Fourth, econometric estimates of recent trend productivity growth 
are not always a good guide to the future; in particular, they cannot take account of future 
technological change.  Fifth, there are plausible reasons to believe that new technologies which 
could eventually have a large impact on productivity are about to deliver but it is too soon to tell.  
Sixth, a sustained decline of business dynamism would be a problem.  In principle, it could probably 
be addressed by reforms to regulation and increased competition but, in practice, this may be ‘too 
difficult’ politically. 
In sum, it seems that the productivity slowdown is real but not necessarily permanent.  The impact 
of technological progress is hard to predict but there is considerable potential on the upside.  Fully 
to realize the potential of new technologies will, however, depend on better supply-side policies. 
                                                          
4 If we consider the implications of the future computerization of employment as equivalent to a an increase in 
the dispersion of worker productivities, then in an equilibrium search and matching labour market model, the 
increase in equilibrium unemployment will be greater in a setting with relatively high unemployment benefit 
rates and employment protection since these are labour market policies which increase the convexity of the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and skill.  In a calibrated model, Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1999) estimate that a common ICT technology shock which would raise unemployment in the United States 
by about 0.4 percentage points during 1975-1995 would have increased unemployment by 4.8 percentage 
points with ‘European Union’ labour market policies. 
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Table 1.  Growth Rates in Different Periods (% per year) 
 United States 
Real GDP/Person 
United States  
Real GDP/Hour 
Worked 
EU 15  
Real GDP/Person 
EU 15  
Real GDP/Hour 
Worked 
1950-73 2.5 2.6  4.0 4.9 
1973-95 1.7 1.3  1.9 2.5 
1995-2007 2.2 2.2  2.0 1.5 
2007-2016 0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.4 
     
2014-23    1.0 0.8 
2016-26 1.0 1.4   
 
Note: EU 15 is the aggregate of the 15 EU member states prior to the 2004 expansion of the 
European Union. 
Sources: The Conference Board (2016); Havik et al. (2014); United States Congressional Budget Office 
(2016) 
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Table 2.  PMR (Product Market Regulation, 0-6) and EP (Employment Protection, 0-6) 
 PMR 1998 PMR 2008 PMR 2013 EP 1998 EP 2008 EP 2013 
Austria 2.12 1.37 1.19 2.75 2.37 2.37 
Belgium 2.30 1.52 1.39 1.85 1.89 1.89 
Denmark 1.66 1.34 1.21 2.13 2.13 2.20 
Finland 1.94 1.34 1.29 2.31 2.17 2.17 
France 2.38 1.52 1.47 2.34 2.47 2.38 
Germany 2.23 1.40 1.28 2.68 2.68 2.68 
Greece 2.75 2.21 1.74 2.80 2.80 2.12 
Ireland 1.86 1.35 1.45 1.44 1.27 1.40 
Italy 2.36 1.51 1.29 2.76 2.76 2.68 
Netherlands 1.82 0.96 0.92 2.84 2.88 2.82 
Norway 1.87 1.56 1.46 2.33 2.33 2.33 
Portugal 2.59 1.69 1.29 4.58 4.42 3.18 
Spain 2.39 1.59 1.44 2.36 2.36 2.05 
Sweden 1.89 1.61 1.52 2.70 2.61 2.61 
Switzerland 2.49 1.55 1.50 1.60 1.60 1.60 
United Kingdom 1.32 1.21 1.08 1.10 1.26 1.10 
United States 1.63 1.59 1.59 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 
Note: employment protection is for regular employment.  On both indicators, a higher score signifies 
more regulation.  
Sources: OECD Product Market Regulation database and Employment Protection database. 
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Table 3.  Effective Average and Effective Marginal Corporate Tax Rates (%) and Public 
Investment (%GDP) 
 EATR 2000 EMTR 2000 EATR 2007 EMTR 2007 EATR 2017 EMTR 2017 
Austria 29.1 17.9 21.6 13.1 21.6 13.1 
Belgium 33.2 17.1 28.1 13.5 28.3 14.4 
Denmark 28.2 19.8 22.2 15.7 19.7 14.1 
Finland 26.1 19.6 23.4 17.3 18.0 12.9 
France 32.0 19.2 29.3 17.5 32.4 19.9 
Germany 32.8 17.0 25.9 13.3 27.0 18.2 
Greece 32.3 13.5 20.2   7.0 25.4   5.2 
Ireland   8.8   5.3 11.1   7.3 11.3 17.2 
Italy 33.8 16.3 30.5 14.1 21.4         -0.1 
Netherlands 30.4 20.4 20.9 13.1 19.1   8.1 
Norway 25.6 20.5 25.9 21.5 22.2 18.1 
Portugal 29.2 14.8 24.0 11.4 25.2 14.9 
Spain 34.0 20.0 33.3 23.4 27.6 24.0 
Sweden 24.7 17.2 24.7 17.2 19.4 13.0 
Switzerland 20.5   8.7 17.5    7.1 17.4   7.1 
United Kingdom 26.9 20.0 26.9 20.0 18.5 17.1 
United States 34.9 23.2 34.9 23.2 34.9 23.2 
 
Sources: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Corporate Tax Database. 
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Table 4.  R & D Expenditure (%GDP) 
 R & D 
(GERD) 2005 
R& D (BERD) 
2005 
R & D (GERD) 
2015 
R & D (BERD) 
2015 
Austria 2.38 1.66 3.07 2.18 
Belgium 1.78 1.21 2.45 1.77 
Denmark 2.39 1.63 2.96 1.89 
Finland 3.33 2.36 2.90 1.94 
France 2.04 1.27 2.23 1.45 
Germany 2.42 1.68 2.87 1.95 
Greece 0.58 0.18 0.96 0.32 
Ireland 1.19 0.78 1.51 1.09 
Italy 1.05 0.53 1.33 0.74 
Netherlands 1.79 0.95 2.01 1.12 
Norway 1.48 0.79 1.93 1.05 
Portugal 0.76 0.29 1.28 0.60 
Spain 1.10 0.59 1.22 0.64 
Sweden 3.39 2.47 3.26 2.27 
United Kingdom 1.57 0.96 1.70 1.12 
United States 2.51 1.73 2.79 1.99 
 
Sources: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators. 
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Table 5.  EU 15: Future Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 Real GDP 
Growth 
Labor Input 
Growth 
Labor Productivity 
Growth 
TFP Growth 
2014-23 1.1 0.3 0.8 0.5 
     
2014-30 1.8 0.2 1.6 1.2 
 
Note: estimates are based on hours worked in row (1) and on workers employed in row (3). 
Sources: Havik et al. (2014); OECD (2014). 
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Table 6.  Contributions to TFP Growth in the U. S. Business Sector (% per year) 
a) 1899-1941 
 1929-1941 1899-1941 
TFP Growth 1.87 1.30 
Great Inventions 0.82 (0.33) 0.51 (0.29) 
Other 1.05 (1.54) 0.79 (1.01) 
 
b) 1974-2012 
 1974-1995 1995-2004 2004-2012 1974-2012 
TFP Growth 0.50 1.61 0.34 0.73 
IT Sectors 0.36 0.72 0.28 0.43 
Other 0.14 0.89 0.06 0.30 
 
Note: following Gordon (2016) ‘great inventions’ comprise technology clusters around electricity, 
internal combustion engine, re-arranging molecules, communications & entertainment; figures in 
parentheses re-classify distribution as other. 
Sources: Bakker et al. (2017); Byrne et al. (2013) 
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Table 7. Allocative Efficiency Scores 
 Manufacturing Services Business Sector 
Austria   0.196   0.222   0.229 
Belgium   0.205 -0.218 -0.012 
Denmark   0.270   0.121   0.184 
Finland   0.668   0.251   0.419 
France   0.461   0.161   0.296 
Germany   0.443   0.399   0.460 
Greece -0.056 -0.235 -0.240 
Italy   0.141 -0.190 -0.039 
Netherlands   0.043 -0.274 -0.137 
Portugal   0.077 -0.069   0.020 
Spain   0.465 -0.052   0.117 
Sweden   0.672   0.253   0.379 
UK    0.300   0.065   0.156 
    
European Union   0.272   0.036   0.140 
United States    0.473   0.358   0.394 
 
Source: online appendix to Andrews and Cingano (2014). 
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Table 8.  Exposure to Skill-Bias of Technological Change 
 Low Educational 
Attainment  
(% labour force) 
Unemployment 
Rate of Lowly- 
Educated (%) 
Employment 
Protection (0-6) 
Net Replacement 
Rate (%) 
Austria 14 10.8 2.37 68 
Belgium 25 14.3 1.89 81 
Denmark 21   8.2 2.20 88 
Finland 14 12.5 2.17 80 
France 22 13.9 2.38 68 
Germany 13 12.0 2.68 82 
Greece 29 27.7 2.12 52 
Ireland 20 18.7 1.40 74 
Italy 39 15.2 2.68 75 
Netherlands 23 10.1 2.82 80 
Portugal 54 14.8 3.18 78 
Spain 43 31.4 2.05 74 
Sweden 17 13.2 2.61 65 
UK 21   7.7 1.26 56 
USA 11 10.6 0.26 52 
 
Notes: low educational attainment is defined as less than upper secondary for ages 25-64 in 2015; 
employment protection is for permanent workers in 2013; net replacement rate is for household 
with 1 earner and 2 children on 67% average wage at initial unemployment in 2014. 
Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance; OECD Employment Protection database; OECD, Tax-Benefit 
Models. 
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Figure 1.  TFP Growth in the United States: Forecasts versus Outcomes 
 
Source: Crafts and Mills (2017) 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Trend tfp growth based on a fixed 20 year sample
Trend tfp growth based on a fixed 25 year sample
10 year ahead projection of average tfp growth adjusted for capacity util ization
% p.a.
